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1 The  point  of  view  endorsed  in  John  Lachs’s  Stoic  Pragmatism  is  easy  to  state,  yet
profound  in  its  application.  If  pragmatists  can  be  accused  of  sometimes  under-
appreciating the irremediable, and stoics of sometimes being fatalist in a manner that
shuts out real possibilities, the two orientations may need each other. His perspective
combines  a  pragmatic  commitment  to  amelioratory  achievement  and  a  stoic
recognition of unbridgeable limits. As the book conveys, the marriage of stoicism and
pragmatism is a reflection of Lachs’s long-tread reflective journey, both in life and in
print.
2 Lachs invokes stoic pragmatism in order to express the need for one’s willingness to
make the world better, yet to remain prepared for realism about lost possibilities, and
to possibly surrender the fight when its continuance is futile. Not unlike individuals in
a working marriage, each school affirms a key philosophic virtue the other seems to
lack, so their union is one of potential mutual empowerment. Lachs suggests that, left
alone, the two orientations risk a corresponding vice of excess, for: “stoics give up too
soon and pragmatists make the mistake of never wanting to give up” (23).
3 Like most of Professor Lachs’s works, this book is wonderfully free of technical jargon,
and refreshingly strives to be actually philosophical, rather than accidentally so by way
of obtuse theoretical frameworks. Lachs provides original diagnoses of key problems
and offers sound proposals for ways through. The results are so obviously rewarding
and apropos of genuinely philosophic reflection that it is unseemly to offer any formal
critical reaction. And so, here I merely offer a reader’s reaction.
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4 Perhaps, one might be tempted to argue, the marriage of pragmatism with stoicism
risks anachronism. Given the lack of kindred scholarly efforts and the historical leap
between  eras  in  comparison  there  might  be  expected  to  be  something  obviously 
connecting the two, something more than the characteristics offered above. But Lachs’s
book  is  far  more  interesting  than  a  sheer  exercise  in  historical  association,  or
theoretical reconciliation. Whether or not stoicism and pragmatism actually need one
another is irrelevant: the point is, for Lachs, they do, and in his hands their marriage
conduces  to  novel  philosophic  prescriptions.  “Age  clarifies.”  Lachs  opens.  “In  the
course of a life of reflection, one’s attitude to the weightiest questions emerges only
slowly” (1). And, it would seem, the time during which that attitude slowly emerges,
the binding thread of various considerations can remain unacknowledged. “It was,” he
continues, “only recently that I managed to characterize my attitude to life as that of a
stoic pragmatist. Once I did, it was easy to find traces of the position in earlier writings
and in my decisions at crucial points in life” (1). So Stoic Pragmatism is in a significant
sense a  work of  intellectual  autobiography,  though by no means of  the sensational
kind,  spinning  tales  of  personal  struggle  and  triumph;  instead,  it  is  appropriately
philosophic,  a  thoughtful  exercise  in  self-evaluation  that  inventories  the  main
trajectories of motivation behind the author’s various preoccupations and applies them
to various key questions.
5 The book is relatively short, divided into four chapters, with a very brief introduction
and  a  philosophically  confessional  epilogue.  The  chapters  thematically  develop  the
book’s  overarching  aim  of  deploying  stoic  and  pragmatist  strategies  to  resolve
fundamental questions. The opening chapter, “What Can Philosophy Do to Make Life
Better?” unequivocally establishes the target audience to include, if not privilege, the
non-philosophical.  While the treatment of major philosophers is hugely abbreviated
and glossy, the presentation is appropriate for the purposes of the chapter and larger
book. In just the first five pages Lachs covers the gambit of Thales, Plato, Aristotle, the
British Empiricists,  Continental  Rationalists,  and yes,  Kant  and Hegel!  Certainly the
discussion here is rapid-fire, roaming, conversational, and generally for the benefit of
the unacquainted.
6 No doubt many of Lachs’s characterizations of historical schools and figures are canned
echoes of hundreds of classroom conversations he has developed for undergraduate
students over the years: but they are the more charming and persuasive for that. Lachs
has a true gift for bringing philosophy to life, for inviting the uninitiated into a table of
conversation to which they perhaps never thought they were invited: “Plato’s so-called
theory of forms amounts to the idea that everything has a nature that it shares with
other beings of the same kind” (4). Characterizations like these reflect the “vintage”
charm of Lachs’s invocation of philosophers and their ideas. The discussions are sincere
and penetrating because they are  inspired,  rather  than merely  provoked,  by major
philosophic schools and figures. And besides, Lachs’s worthy larger aim is to guide lay
philosophic readers through some rather fat thickets of historical growth; ability to so
guide requires  knowledge of  their  depths.  What  counts  in such an endeavor is not
achievement or resolution of some new theoretical puzzle, but the opening of historical
vistas capable of helping one appreciate the relevance of philosophy to life.
7 Accordingly,  Lachs  considers  whether  philosophy  can  any  more  produce  public
intellectuals. He identifies three ways that the discipline in its professional structure
discourages  “engagement  with  the  broader  public”.  Preferring  argument  over
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knowledge  of  current  affairs  and  facts,  incentivizing  and  rewarding  technical
obtuseness  and  obfuscation,  and  the  misconceived  categorization  of  philosophy
alongside physics and anthropology, and/or science-directed inquiries that unfairly pit
philosophy against more empirically-grounded rivals: all three of these, Lachs argues,
account for the “retreat” of philosophy into the Ivory tower and its “abandonment of
the traditional role as the critic of our beliefs and practices” (17). These criticisms of
the professional obstacles to genuine philosophic reflection are not only fair, but much
needed. John Lachs has achieved enough, to say nothing of occupied enough of a place
and time in the profession, to have earned a stature to be able to say such things and
expect someone to listen. This example of “power speaking truth to power” is rare,
and, whether it bears fruit in the present case, it well may have done so in the past. For
some amount of  years  Lachs has not  hesitated holding views to which some of  his
closest  colleagues  object,  and,  as  he  confesses  in  the  book’s  epilogue,  has  raised
objections to powerful administrators. Such sincere fidelity to conscience and truth is,
to say the least, admirable and rare.
8 Lachs’s purpose of achieving larger connections is one that has been fairly consistent
throughout his philosophic career, at least since the mid-90’s, addressing himself to the
worthy  question:  why  philosophy?  Why  does  it  matter?  In  Stoic  Pragmatism  Lachs
appears to be taking a longer inventory of things, squaring his early-career defenses of
epiphenomenalism  and  discussions  of  human  nature  and  mediation  (see  especially
Intermediate Man [1981] and Mind and Philosophers [1987]) with his current point of view.
Not  dissimilar  from  the  inventory  taken  by  Lachs’s  philosophic  model,  George
Santayana in the “Apologia” he published in the Library of Living Philosophers edition
devoted to his  thought,  Lachs sees tremendous continuity between his  current and
earlier perspectives: “Once I [settled on the ‘stoic-pragmatist’ characterization of my
attitude]  it  was  easy  to  find  traces  of  the  position  in  earlier  writings  and  in  my
decisions at crucial points in life” (1).
9 Chapter  three  of  the  book  illustrates  Lachs’s  original  ability  to  think  through
fundamental  issues  using  the  resources  of  American  philosophy  as  his  guide.  He
critically  considers  forms  of  “human  blindness”  as  provoked  by  claims  in  William
James’s famous essay of the same title, and, using James’s famous discussion of “moral
holidays” in his Pragmatism lectures, sets up an interesting framework for considering
the sharp contrast between James and his absolutist nemesis Josiah Royce. The implied
critical wedge of Lachs’s deft analysis is the naturalist perspective of his philosophic
forebear,  Santayana.  Lachs  does  a  great  job  of  exposing  the  too-overlooked,  but
nevertheless shared moralism of James and Royce. He pulls out the senses in which
James’s “Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” reveals him to possess the “same moral
fervor” as his erstwhile adversary Royce. Lachs’s treatment of the interesting relation
between James  and Royce  is  clearly  the  result  of  a  close  study  of  Santayana,  as  is
inferred from the fact that he is so easily able to call their moralistic bluff.
10 One point of criticism I must identify, Lachs’s open-palmed stance and ground-level,
common-sense narrative at times loses some of its power when certain unnecessary
moral assessments seep into considerations. These tend to bubble up, revealingly, in his
occasional indulgences in sharp personal criticism or reprimand. On multiple occasions
Lachs chides logic-chopping philosophers of language for their phoniness, and calls out
merely  “professional  philosophers”  for  setting  up obstacles  to  genuine  philosophic
engagement. These laments are mostly well-taken, and well-placed, for example in the
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first-chapter section “Can Philosophy Produce Public Intellectuals Today?” where, as
indicated, he justifiably calls attention to the various senses in which the “profession”
has set up obstacles to genuine philosophic engagement.
11 But  these  observations  are  sometimes  combined  with  unfortunate  remarks  that
unnecessarily  reveal  Lachs’s  personal  aversions,  as  when he emphasizes the unique
duty philosophers have of practicing what they preach: “…inner divisions are relatively
harmless in the case of chemists, whose professional views may have little bearing on
their  lives.  But  lawyers  who  violate  the  laws,  atheist  priests,  bankrupt  financial
advisors,  and  obese  physicians,  along  with  irrational  philosophers,  rightly  arouse
suspicion” (18-19).
12 One cannot help wincing a bit at such characterizations. The point about disingenuous
philosophers is worth making, but one wonders whether it adds anything to the point
to offer  directly unflattering descriptions—among others he makes,  Lachs mentions
William  Bennett’s  “excessive  bouts  of  gambling”  and  the  “spewing”  of  “mindless
Leninism” by Hilary Putnam. Perhaps more hazardous: why say anything of professions 
or  disciplines  that  allegedly  require  more  or  less  coordination of  “inner  and outer”
convictions  and  commitments?  It  all  seems  a  rather  slippery  slope  to  travel  for  a
narrative that is so otherwise balanced and seeking of reconciliation and relief from
impenetrable puzzles. It is not clear but, whether or not Lachs is suggesting that obese
physicians  have  anything  in  common  with  rapping  philosophers  (Cornel  West  is
suggestively included in the discussion), their very association seems curious at best. I
simply suggest that this occasional injection of personal bias undermines the otherwise
refreshingly open-minded narrative of which Lachs is a veritable master.
13 I  must leave to other more qualified commentators the task of fully evaluating the
various  interesting  remarks  Lachs  makes  about  the  challenge  pragmatists  face
regarding questions of ultimate limit, including especially, the problem of death. It is
enough here to saythat the challenge has been raised, and that Lachs takes seriously
the idea that it  may be a problem for the pragmatist  orientation specifically:  “It  is
understandable that critics should hold pragmatism accountable for what it says about
death”  (53).  Perpetual  improvement  of  life  (“amelioration”)  being  the  hallmark  of
pragmatism, it makes sense that final ends fail to find a comfortable category in the
pragmatist framework. That said, as Lachs takes pains to show, pragmatists do attempt
an answer: “The question of what pragmatists would have us do in relation to death has
a simple answer: fend it off one day at a time” (60). “Work on death” may not sound
like an immediately helpful strategy to those in perilous distress over it, but it does
seem a reasonable way of expressing what is likely the only recourse pragmatists have
if, as Lachs holds, its sole commitment is to the “improvement of life here and now”.
14 This book should be front-listed in general undergraduate courses on philosophy, and
pushed and marketed in bookselling contexts aimed at audiences of broad intellectual
interest.  The  presentation  is  intellectually  conversational,  and  helpfully  devoid  of
technicaltheoretical complications. Professor Lachs proves himself here, as in previous
publications, to be an ideal purveyor of philosophic ideas to an inquisitive public.
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